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This study examines how the demand for auditor skill sets has changed over the past decade as 
well as how these changes relate to audit quality and audit fees. Using a novel dataset that contains 
the near-universe of online job postings by accounting firms from 2007 to 2017, we find that audit 
firms have decreased their demand for auditors and increased their demand for IT-related 
personnel. We also find that audit firms are increasingly demanding expanded skill sets from their 
auditors—the portion of cognitive, social, and IT-related skills has increased over our sample 
period whereas financial skills have remained relatively flat. Further, we find substantial variation 
in the demand for skills not only across audit firms, but also across offices within an audit firm. 
More importantly, these differences in skill requirements have a significant effect on audit 
quality—specifically, audit offices that demand more social and cognitive skills are less likely to 
have clients experience subsequent restatements. Taken together, our findings provide new 






 The emergence of new technologies is redefining labor markets across all industries. Routine-
based tasks that employees were typically responsible for are increasingly being completed by 
computers, artificial intelligence, and machine learning algorithms (e.g., Levy and Murnane 2012; 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Remus and Levy 2016). Given the growing prevalence of these 
disruptive technologies and their influence on the competitive landscape, firms are responding by 
demanding labor that can complement and deploy them (e.g., Deming 2017; Deming and Kahn 2018). 
The audit industry is no exception. With innovations in big data, analytics, and distributed ledger 
technologies (blockchain), how audits are conducted is evolving rapidly and auditors are expected to 
possess the necessary skills to keep pace with these changes. However, we know little about how these 
forces have shaped the audit profession in recent years, beyond anecdotal and survey evidence. In this 
study, we exploit a unique and nearly comprehensive dataset of online job postings by accounting 
firms in the US from 2007 to 2017 to provide the first large sample evidence on how the auditing labor 
market has evolved over this time. Specifically, we address three core research questions over our 
sample period: 1) How has the demand for auditors and non-auditor information technology (IT) staff 
changed? 2) How has the demand for auditor skill sets changed? 3) How have these shifts in demand 
affected audit quality? 
 Understanding how recent changes in technology have impacted the auditing labor market, and 
ultimately audit quality, is both timely and relevant.  The audit industry has invested heavily in 
emerging technologies and it remains unclear how these investments affect auditors. In recent years, 
accounting firms have spent approximately $3 to $5 billion annually on technology (PCAOB 2017a).1 
Whether audit firms can effectively utilize new technological tools to enhance audit quality hinges 
critically on the adaptability of their auditors—i.e., whether auditors have the relevant skills to 
                                                 
1 Ernst & Young recently announced a plan to invest $1 billion as part of its innovation drive where a primary goal 
of these investments is to improve audit quality (EY 2018). 
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implement and effectively integrate new technologies into the audit process (CAQ 2018). As Roshan 
Ramlukan, an EY partner and a leader in global assurance analytics, nicely summarized, “the human 
element of data analytics is the most critical factor” in this data-driven digital era (Tschakert and 
Kozlowski, 2016). The PCAOB has expressed similar sentiments:  
The emergence and use of new technologies in the audit will require professional 
skepticism and critical thinking by auditors in new ways. These technology tools and 
approaches may also highlight the need for stronger skills in more subjective and 
qualitative areas, as auditors learn to work with data and technology in new ways. 
(PCAOB 2017b) 
 
Therefore, it is important to gain a better understanding of how the demand for auditors and their 
skillsets have changed in recent years.  
 We address our research questions by exploiting a novel dataset of job vacancies from Burning 
Glass Technologies (BG) that includes nearly all online job postings in the US from 2007 to 2017.  
This is a relatively new and rich data set that has been used by labor economists to capture skill 
demands for professionals in various occupations (Deming and Kahn 2018; Hershbein and Kahn 
2018).2 Each job post in the dataset contains approximately 70 standardized fields, including detailed 
information on the employer, occupation, job location, as well as skill, education, and experience 
requirements. The granular job posting data thus allow us to capture how the demand for auditor skills 
has changed over time as well as how it varies across audit firms and within firms across different 
office locations. Our sample, which focuses on the audit industry, includes over 500,000 job posts over 
our sample period for 107 unique audit firms.  
 We begin by providing descriptive evidence on how the mix of job types demanded by audit 
firms has changed over our sample period. We find that, among all the job postings by audit firms, 
while the percentage of audit positions has gradually decreased, the percentage of IT positions has 
gradually increased over our sample period. In particular, the percentage of audit positions was 22% 
                                                 
2 For instance, Hershbein and Kahn (2018) use the BG data to study how the Great Recession altered firms’ demand 
for routine-based jobs. They perform useful validity checks by comparing the BG data to other data sources that list 
job vacancies at an industry-level or occupation-level, such as the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and the 
Current Population Survey.   
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in 2007, decreased to 14% in 2012, and dropped further to 7% in 2017. In contrast, the percentage of 
IT positions was 3% in 2007, increased to 11% in 2012, and went further up to 21% in 2017. We also 
demonstrate the increase in IT jobs was driven almost entirely by the Big 4 whereas the decline in 
audit jobs was muted, but still present, for the Big 4.3 These findings suggest that Big 4 accounting 
firms are not only investing financially into technology, but also changing the composition of their 
workforce to adopt to the evolving technologies. 
We then turn to our main analysis and examine the skills demanded for the subset of audit 
positions. Specifically, we focus on three skill categories: technology skills, cognitive skills, and social 
skills. We choose these skill requirements for several reasons. First, prior research in the economics 
literature has focused on these skills when studying the impact of technological development on 
professional jobs (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011). Second, these 
are important skills for those in the auditing profession. It has been widely reported that technology 
skills are becoming necessary for auditors and that, as computers complete more routine tasks, auditors 
will focus more on complex tasks that require cognitive and social skills (e.g., Davenport and Raphael 
2017). We additionally incorporate financial skills given the importance of these skills for auditors. 
We first provide descriptive evidence on the time-series variation in the skills demanded of 
audit personnel. We find a significant increase in the number of skills demanded for audit personnel, 
consistent with upskilling in the aftermath of the great recession (Hershbein and Kahn 2018). We also 
find that jobs posted by Big 4 firms demand more skills relative to non-Big 4 firms, as do jobs posted 
for more senior auditors. With respect to the mix of skills demanded, we find the percentage of finance-
related skills remains relatively flat over the sample period while cognitive, social, and IT-related skills 
all increase as a fraction of total skills. These findings are consistent with the assertions that auditors 
will need to possess greater qualitative skills to complement the increases in technological skills. 
                                                 
3 These results hold after we control for audit firm or audit office fixed effects. 
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We then show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the demand for job skills, even within 
firm, location, and year, and when controlling for job characteristics such as seniority as well as 
education and experience requirements. As expected, there is systematic variation, both across audit 
firms and audit offices, in the amount and type of skills demanded. However, much variation remains 
even after controlling for an extensive set of controls. At the office-level this residual variance ranges 
between 30 and 60% (depending on the skill type), suggesting that audit offices have considerable 
discretion in the types of skills they demand for audit personnel. 
Next, we examine whether the demand for certain skill sets is associated with audit quality. 
Given the discretion in skill demands afforded to audit offices, we aggregate job posts at the audit 
office level and capture the average number of skills per job demanded within the audit office. To 
proxy for audit quality, we examine future restatements of the clients audited by the corresponding 
audit office. We find the average number of total skills posted per job is negatively correlated with 
future restatements, consistent with more skilled auditors providing higher quality audits. Interestingly, 
this finding is driven primarily by the demand for cognitive and social skills, which suggests that 
despite the growing importance of technologies in the profession, cognitive and social skills remain an 
important skillset for auditors.  
Finally, we examine how the skills sets of audit personnel correlate with audit fees. On the one 
hand, auditors with more skills are presumably of higher quality than auditors with fewer skills. Higher 
quality auditors may demand higher wages, which could be passed on to the client, resulting in higher 
audit fees. On the other hand, higher quality auditors may be more efficient in performing audit tasks, 
which could result in less time billed to the client and thus lower fees. Our results suggest that audit 
offices with higher skilled auditors charge lower audit fees relative to audit offices with lower skilled 
auditors, and this effect is predominantly driven by cognitive skills.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, a large audit literature examines 
how various factors such as industry specialization and Big N office size affect audit quality (e.g., 
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Francis and Yu 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010).  However, there is scant research on how auditor 
attributes affect audit quality. Indeed, a survey by Defond and Zhang (2014) calls for more research to 
explore how different dimensions of auditor competencies, including the traits of individual auditors, 
affect audit quality. Our study adds to this literature by studying the specific skills demanded by audit 
firms. Further, our study complements recent research that exploits detailed proprietary audit input 
data such as audit hours from the PCAOB to study the link between audit inputs and audit quality 
(Aobdia, Siddiqui, and Vinelli 2018; Abodia, Choudhary, and Newberger 2018; Gipper, Hail, and 
Leuz 2019) by introducing auditor skills as another input that can affect audit quality. 
Second, to our knowledge, our study is the first to examine how the era of emerging 
technologies has reshaped human capital requirements in the audit industry. While emerging 
technologies are undoubtedly disrupting various dimensions of the audit process (PCAOB 2017a; 
AICPA 2017b), there is little empirical evidence on this topic—extant research is predominantly 
normative or small-scale surveys (e.g., Lowe et al. 2017). Our study adds to this stream of research by 
providing large sample evidence on how the demand for auditor skill sets has evolved and how this 
shift in demand affects audit quality. 
Third, our study complements the growing labor economics literature on the effect of 
technological advancements on the labor market (Deming 2017; Deming and Kahn 2018; Hershbein 
and Kahn 2018) by focusing specifically on the audit industry. While understanding how technologies 
have affected the demand for skills in the overall economy is undoubtedly important, there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the role of technology across different industries within an economy, 
across different firms within an industry, and even across different functions within a firm. By focusing 
on a specific industry with rich institutional features, our study can provide unique insights that are of 
interest not only to researchers, but also to accounting professionals, regulators, and educators. 
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 Finally, the increasing use of emerging technologies in auditing has important implications for 
accounting educators. Data analytics has started to be integrated into accounting curricula,4 but there 
remains substantial room for growth. Informing accounting educators about the demand for data 
analytics skills has the potential to both spearhead this growth and shape how educators prepare the 
next generation of auditors by informing them about the skills now demanded in the profession.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related 
literature and introduces our research questions. Section 3 describes our sample. Section 4 presents our 
main empirical results. Section 5 reports results of additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Our study is most related to two streams of literature: the accounting literature that examines 
the determinants of audit quality and the labor economics literature that studies the effect of 
technological changes on labor markets. 
2.1. Audit Quality 
Considerable research in accounting has been devoted to studying the determinants of audit 
quality. For instance, prior research suggests that audit firms have various incentives to produce high 
quality audits to manage reputational risks as well as to mitigate litigation risk (Weber et al. 2008; 
Skinner and Srinivasan 2012; Lobo and Zhao 2013). This research also examines auditor competencies 
and finds that industry specialization and Big N office sizes are positively associated with audit quality 
(Balsam et al. 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010).5  
Despite a rich literature on the determinants of audit quality, there is relatively scant research 
on how auditor attributes affect audit quality. Recent studies find that audit partner characteristics are 
                                                 
4 For instance, KPMG has partnered with nine business schools across the US to offer a “Master of Accounting with 
Data and Analytics Program” for their employees.  
https://home.kpmg/us/en/home/media/press-releases/2017/08/kpmg-expands-award-winning-master-of-accounting-
with-data-and-analytics-program.html 
5 See DeFond and Zhang (2014) and Donovan, Frankel, Lee, Martin and Seo (2014) for a more thorough review of 
the auditing literature. 
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associated with audit quality (Aobdia et al. 2015; Chi et al. 2017; Gul et al. 2013; Knechel et al. 2015), 
but we are unaware of any studies that have examined the influence of staff auditors’ characteristics. 
A recent survey by Defond and Zhang (2014) calls for more research to explore how different 
dimensions of auditor competencies, including the traits of individual auditors, affect audit quality. 
We add to this literature by examining the demand for specific auditor skills.  
Our study is also related to a growing literature on audit productivity—the efficiency with 
which audit inputs (e.g., audit hours) are transformed into audit outputs (e.g., audit quality). Due to 
data limitations, prior studies tend to use proprietary data from non-US countries to study this relation 
(Blokdijk et al. 2006; Caramanis and Lennox 2008). However, with the availability of proprietary audit 
input data at the engagement level from the PCAOB, recent studies have begun to examine how 
engagement level inputs such as audit hours, auditor rank, and auditor experience affect audit quality 
(Aobdia, Siddiqui, and Vinelli 2018; Aobdia, Choudhary, and Newberger 2018; Gipper, Hail, and 
Leuz 2018).6 Our study complements this research by introducing auditor skills as another input that 
affects audit quality. 
2.2. Technological Advancements and Skill Requirements in Labor Markets 
A growing economics literature studies how technological changes (e.g., the computerization 
of the labor market in the US) affect the demand for labor skills (Auto, Levy, and Murnane 2003; 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2014). 
Advances in computing power have expanded the set of tasks that machines can perform, from basic 
routine-manual tasks to more complicated tasks such as financial management and tax preparation 
(Levy and Murnane 2012; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Remus and Levy 2017). However, certain 
skills, such as social and cognitive skills, are less likely to be replaced by technology. One’s ability to 
read and react to others is based on tacit knowledge, and these abilities are likely complementary to 
                                                 
6 For instance, Aobdia, Choudhary, and Newberger (2018) shows that higher audit hours and a more experienced 
audit team are associated with higher audit quality at the engagement level. This study also provides a nice summary 
of the literature on audit productivity. 
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the advancement of technology (Autor, David, and Gordon 2015; Lu 2015). Technological advances 
may thus lead to a polarized labor market where technology brings substantial growth in the 
employment of high-skill occupations and low-skill manual service occupations at the expense of 
middle-skill occupations (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006).  
Our study complements this literature by studying the interactions between technology and 
labor skill demands for a specific industry, auditing. By focusing on a specific industry with rich 
institutional features, our study can provide unique insights that are of interest not only to researchers, 
but also to accounting professionals, regulators, and educators. 
2.3 Research Questions 
We empirically test three sets of research questions. First, audit firms are beginning to adopt 
and integrate new technologies such as process automation (e.g., self-service data extraction from 
financial or operational systems) and artificial intelligence into the audit process. As this occurs, certain 
functions, especially traditionally time-consuming manual tasks (e.g., contract review and asset 
verification), may be performed more efficiently by machines than employees. This may affect audit 
firms’ demand for both auditors and non-auditor technology staff. Therefore, our first set of research 
questions is as follows: 
RQ1a: During our sample period, has the demand for auditors decreased? 
 
RQ1b: During our sample period, has the demand for non-audit IT staff increased? 
 
Second, we argue that emerging technologies may affect not only the composition of audit firm 
staff, but also the skill sets that audit firms demand from auditors. With the prevalence of data analytics, 
artificial intelligence, and distributed ledger technologies, audit firms cannot afford to invest only in 
new technology without obtaining the necessary talent to leverage these technologies. Audit firms are 
likely employing data scientists, who can help auditors to capitalize on new technological tools, while 
simultaneously recruiting and training auditors to have the relevant skill sets to implement these new 
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tools. The demand for auditors to acquire technological skills is evident in the increasingly data-driven 
curriculum in both undergraduate and masters accounting programs.  
Meanwhile, as machines take on more routine-based manual audit tasks, other auditor skills 
may become more pertinent as auditors focus on tasks that require (i) subjective and qualitative 
judgment, and (ii) collaboration both with audit team members and with clients. This is likely to be 
reflected by a greater demand for cognitive and social skills. Finally, these increases in skill demands 
will either lead to audit firms demanding more skilled auditors (‘upskilling’) or substituting for skills 
that were previously demanded. Therefore, our second set of research questions is as follows: 
RQ2a: During our sample period, has audit firms’ demand for technology skills increased? 
 
RQ2b: During our sample period, has audit firms’ demand for cognitive and social skills increased? 
 
RQ2c: During our sample period, has audit firms’ demand for total skills increased (upskilling)? 
 
Third, the ultimate goal of investing in technology and talent is to remain competitive and 
improve audit quality. However, it is unclear how the various skills we study will map into audit 
quality.  To the extent that a high-quality audit requires not only efficient use of data, but also sound 
judgement and collaborative teamwork, cognitive and social skills may complement technology-
related skills in the audit process. Therefore, our third research question is as follows: 




We use a recently developed dataset from Burning Glass Technologies (BG) to capture audit 
firms’ demand for certain job types and the associated skill requirements. BG is an employment 
analytics and labor market information firm. BG’s algorithms continually scrape roughly 40,000 online 
job boards and company websites to aggregate and parse job postings. BG’s proprietary algorithms 
remove duplicate postings and convert them into a systematic, machine-readable format. The end result 
is a dataset of nearly 100 million electronic job postings in the United States from January 2007 to 
  
10 
December 2017, which we obtain through an agreement with BG.7 The dataset contains detailed 
information corresponding to each unique job posting, including the date of the posting, the job title, 
the geographical location of the job, the skills required for the job, the name of the employer (for about 
65% of postings), as well as education and experience requirements (for about 50% of the postings). 
The large sample size allows us to explore the potential heterogeneity in skill demands over time as 
well as across audit firms and across offices within the same firm. 
An important question about the BG data is whether they accurately capture audit firms’ 
demand for auditors or auditor skills, because a firm’s job postings may not be representative of its 
actual employment. Hershbein and Kahn (2018) use the data to study how the Great Recession altered 
firms’ demand for routine-based jobs, and they perform several validity checks by comparing the BG 
data to other data sources such as the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) and the 
Current Population Survey, which list job vacancies at the industry or occupation level. Hershbein and 
Kahn (2018) find the BG data to provide a strong representation of white-collar occupations (e.g., 
computer, mathematical, management, healthcare practitioner, business occupations), whereas blue-
collar occupations (e.g., transportation, food preparation and serving, production, construction) tend 
to be less well-represented.8 This appears reasonable given that white-collar job seekers likely use the 
internet to find a job at a higher rate than blue-collar job seekers.  Given that auditor jobs are white-
collar positions, these patterns suggest that the BG data should be reasonably accurate in capturing 
demand for auditors. 
To identify the audit firms and related job postings in BG, we manually match the audit firm 
names in Audit Analytics to the BG data. Given that the job postings provide location data we further 
restrict the sample to cities in which the corresponding auditor conducted at least one audit over our 
sample period. Our initial sample comprises 554,224 job postings, by 107 unique audit firms (876 
                                                 
7 The BG data exclude the years 2008 and 2009. 
8 See their internet appendix for details: https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/files/7383.pdf  
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unique audit offices) over the period from 2007 to 2017. Table 1 Panel A reports the sample 
distribution over the sample period, separately for Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. 84% of the job 
postings are made by Big 4 firms, and this figure is relatively stable over the sample period – the posts 
by Big 4 firms comprise over 80% of total posts in seven of the nine years.  
To provide support that our sample is representative of the audit market, we compare the 
distribution of job postings across different cities in the BG data to the distribution across of audit fees 
across different cities in Audit Analytics. Specifically, Table 1 Panel B reports the top 20 cities based 
on job postings in our BG sample and the top 20 cities based on audit fees in the cross-section of Audit 
Analytics coverage during our sample period. Among the top 20 cities, 18 appear in both lists. 
Moreover, the top 20 cities both comprise roughly 73% of their respective populations.  
 
4. Empirical Tests 
4.1 Audit Firms’ Labor Demands  
 We categorize each job post into four job types: Audit, Tax, Advisory, and IT (Information 
Technology).9 In Table 1 Panel C, we report the job type distribution over our sample period. One 
takeaway is that the demand for audit jobs and tax jobs appear to be decreasing and the demand for 
advisory and IT jobs appear to be increasing over the period from 2007 to 2017. In 2007, audit job 
postings and tax job postings comprise about 22% and 30% of all the job postings by audit firms in 
our sample, respectively. By 2017, audit job postings and tax job postings comprise only about 7% 
and 10%, respectively. In contrast, in 2007, IT-related job postings are only 3% of the job postings, 
but 21% in 2017. The relative demand for advisory jobs also increased from 14% in 2007 to 31% in 
2017. For other job types, there is no clear trend during our sample period. The relatively stable share 
                                                 
9 BG provides the job title from the online job posting, but the job titles are quite unstandardized. For example, there 
are over 100,000 unique job titles in the dataset. We use a series of keywords to categorize each job title into the 
various functions. We then iteratively hand check a sample of the (most frequent) job titles and update the keywords 
accordingly. We are able to categorize over 70% of the job postings. Many of the remaining job posts pertain to other 
job functions (e.g., marketing, lawyers, support staff, etc.), though not all. 
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of other job types helps assuage concerns that the trends we observe are driven by misclassifications 
in our job type categorization. Next, we more formally examine how the demand for these job functions 
has changed over our sample period. 
Our first set of research questions suggests that audit firms’ demand for labor will shift over 
our sample period. To formally test our first set of research questions, we estimate the following OLS 
regression model: 
% Job Type = β0 + β1 * Time Trend + Σβk * Control Variables + ε,       (1) 
where % Job Type is the proportion of the corresponding job type relative to all job postings by an 
audit firm or office in the corresponding calendar year. Since we are unable to identify the exact time 
at which audit firms began to adopt various emerging technologies, we examine how their demand for 
different types of positions shifted over the sample period. We capture this shift using the variable 
Time Trend, which is equal to corresponding calendar year, rescaled to be between zero and one.10 We 
conduct these tests at the audit firm by year level and include audit firm fixed effects or at the audit 
office by year level and include audit office fixed effects.11 Controlling for audit firm or audit office 
fixed effects helps to rule out the possibility that labor demand composition varies with the firm or 
office’s geographical location or some other unobservable firm or office effect. Standard errors are 
clustered by year. To mitigate the potential noise in our measure, we require a minimum of 30 job 
postings by each audit firm/office-year. This results in 237 audit firm-year observations for the audit 
firm level analysis and 1,954 audit office-year observations for the audit office level analysis.  
 Table 2 Panel A (B) reports the regression results of equation (1) at audit firm (office) level. 
Consistent with H1a and H1b, in both cases we observe a statistically significant increase in IT job 
demand and a decrease in audit job demand. At the audit firm level, the proportion of IT job postings 
increased by 3% whereas the proportion of audit job postings decreased by 6.7%. The effects are even 
                                                 
10 The sample period is 2007 to 2017 so this variable is equal to (year t – 2007) / (2017 – 2007). 
11 Throughout the paper we consider each audit firm by city combination a unique audit office. 
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more pronounced at the audit office level. At the audit office level, the proportion of IT job postings 
increased 8.9% and the proportion of audit job postings decreased 7.7%.12 Results also show that the 
relative demand for advisory jobs has increased 5% (10%) and the relative demand for tax job has 
decreased 5% (9%) in the audit firm (office) level analysis. These observations are consistent with the 
summary statistics reported in Table 1 Panel C. We also see no significant changes in the proportion 
of uncategorized jobs, suggesting our findings are driven by shifts between the job functions we have 
identified and not by shifts to and from unclassified jobs.  
 Next, we examine whether the shifts in job demands we have documented vary across Big 4 
and non-Big 4 firms by interacting the time trend in equation (1) with an indicator variable for Big 4 
status. The results are reported in Table 3.13 As in Table 2, Panel A reports the results from the firm 
level analysis and Panel B reports the results from the office level analysis. In both cases, we see the 
increase in demand for IT-related positions is driven almost entirely by the Big 4 firms. The main 
effect on the time trend is insignificant in the firm level analysis and it is weakly significant in the 
office level analysis, but has a magnitude less than 50% of the corresponding coefficient in Table 2. 
Conversely, we see the reduction in audit job postings is less pronounced for the Big 4 firms. Whereas 
the reduction in audit job postings is 7% (12%) in the firm (office) level analysis for non-Big 4 firms, 
the corresponding reductions are only 4% (5%) for the Big 4 firms, though these decreases are still 
statistically significant.  
4.2 Audit Firms’ Skill Demands 
 As noted earlier, the BG dataset includes the skills that are demanded in each job posting, which 
allows us to empirically analyze the skill sets of auditors. Auditors’ skill sets are one of the most 
important audit inputs (Defond and Zhang, 2014; Aobdia 2019). However, due to lack of data, 
                                                 
12 Different estimates at the audit firm level and audit office level could be caused by the heterogeneity in labor 
demand across offices within the same audit firm. 
13 The main effect for the Big 4 indicator variable is absorbed by the audit firm or audit office fixed effects. 
  
14 
empirical analysis on the skill sets of auditors has yet to be studied in the prior literature. In this section, 
we attempt to take a step towards filling that void.  
 BG cleans and codes the text of job ads into a taxonomy of thousands of unique but 
standardized skill requirements. Beginning with a set of predefined possible skills, BG uses machine-
learning algorithms to search text in an ad for an indication that the skill is required. For example, for 
teamwork-related skills, BG searches for the keyword “teamwork” but also searches for similar 
variations such as “ability to work as a team.” BG then categorizes its keywords into a series of skill 
demands. We thus use these skills to better understand what types of skills audit firms are demanding 
from auditors and whether there is heterogeneity in the skill demands across time, across audit firms, 
or even across audit offices within the same audit firm.   
Of the 554,224 job postings examined in Tables 1 through 3, 58,355 correspond to audit jobs, 
and this subset of audit job postings contains over 2,000 uniquely identified skills.14 Figure 1 presents 
a word cloud of the top 200 skills that appear in our sample to provide some intuition behind the types 
of skills BG categorizes.15 Clearly, key words representing accounting knowledge such as 
“accounting,” “financial reporting,” and “financial statements” are the most prominent skills in the 
audit job postings. Besides financial skills, other prominent skills include “communication skills,” 
“mentoring,” “writing,” “research,” “leadership,” “people management,” “team work/collaboration,” 
“oracle,” “sap,” “sas,” “computer literacy,” among others.  
 Because the skills demanded are not standardized across different audit firms, following 
existing literature on job task analysis (i.e., Deming and Kahn 2018; Hershbein and Kahn 2018), we 
develop a set of key words to categorize three sets of auditor skills that are likely to be most affected 
by technological changes in the audit industry: IT skills, cognitive skills, and social skills. In addition, 
we also consider financial skills given their relevance for auditors. IT skills include keywords such as 
                                                 
14 The whole BG database contains over 10,000 uniquely identified skills. 
15 In terms of the frequency skills appear in the sample, the frequency of the top 200 ranked skills comprises 91.8% 
of the total number of skills in the sample. 
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“computer,” “data,” “spreadsheets,” or are classified as software-related by BG. Cognitive skills 
include keywords such as “problem solving,” “research,” and “analytical.” Social skills include 
keywords such as “communication,” “teamwork,” and “collaboration.” Financial skills include 
keywords such as “accounting,” “financial reporting,” and “auditing”. In Panel A of Table 4 we report 
the keywords and phrases that fall into each category. We choose these keywords and phrases based 
on existing economic literature studying job tasks (Deming and Kahn, 2018; Deming and Noray, 2019) 
and by reading the skills within our audit job posting sample.                          
 Table 4 Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the skill categories within the subset of audit 
job postings. For each skill category we report three measures to capture the degree of importance for 
the corresponding skill in the job post. First, the number of skills demanded in the corresponding skill 
type captures the intensity of skill requirement. For example, #(Cognitive Skill) is the number of 
cognitive skills demanded in the job post. Second, the number of skills demanded in the corresponding 
skill type scaled by total skills demanded in the job post captures the relative weight of different skill 
requirements. For example, %(Cognitive Skill) is the ratio of the number of cognitive skills demanded 
to the total number of skills demanded in a job posting. Third, we incorporate a series of indicator 
variables for the presence of a corresponding skill type to capture the extensive margin of the job skill 
requirement. For example, variable I(Cognitive Skill) equals one if a job posting requires at least one 
cognitive skill, zero otherwise. The variables are defined analogously for IT, social, and financial 
skills. 
 The audit job postings in our sample contain an average of 12 unique skills demanded per job 
post. As might be expected, a large portion of these skills are financial – the job posts contain an 
average of 5 financial skills per posting, 44% of the skills are financial, and 92% of the jobs contain at 
least one financial skill listed in the posting. However, there is more variation in the remaining skill 
types. For instance, 48% of the postings contain at least one cognitive skill whereas 61% contain a 
social skill, and 33% contain an IT skill. On average, an audit job posting lists 0.8 cognitive skills, 1.5 
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social skills and 1.2 IT skills. Collectively, the four skill categories we examine capture nearly 70% of 
the skills demanded in the audit job postings in our sample. 
 Table 4 Panel C reports the Pearson correlations among the different skill measures. As 
expected the total number of skills is positively correlated with each of the various skill measures. 
Moreover, focusing on the number of skills in the job post, all of the four defined skill types are 
positively correlated, but the correlations are quite low. For instance, the highest correlation is between 
the number of cognitive skills and the number of social skills at 33%. In the next section we examine 
the determinants of these skill demands.   
4.3 Determinants of Auditor Skill Demands 
In this section, we examine the determinants of auditor skill demands. To explore the possible 
observable determinants of job postings for auditors, we begin by estimating the following OLS 
regression model:  
Skills = β0 + β1 * Time Trend + β2 * Edu + β3 * Exp + β4 * I(Edu) 
       + β5 * I(Exp) + β6 * Hierarchy + β7 * Big4 + ε,                (2) 
where Skills are the different measures of skill requirements. Time Trend is equal to corresponding 
calendar year, rescaled to be between zero and one, as defined earlier.  Edu and Exp are the number of 
years of education and experience required, respectively. Since some audit job postings do not have 
education and experience requirements, we also control for whether a job posting has education and 
experience or not. I(Edu) and I(Exp) take the value of 1 if a job posting lists and education or 
experience requirement, and otherwise takes the value 0. We set Edu and Exp to 0 when missing. 
Hierarchy is a variable coded to equal to 1 for interns, 2 for associates, and 3 for senior associates, 4 
for managers, 5 for senior managers, 6 for directors, and 7 for partners. We categorize each job 
posting’s hierarchy based on the job title in the posting. In our final sample for auditor job posting, 
5.5% are interns, 24.9% are associates, 36.7% are senior associates, 24.1% are managers, 6.6% are 
senior managers, 2% are directors, and 0.2% are partners. Big4 is a dummy variable that takes the 
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value of 1 if the job posting is issued by a Big4 audit firm. Standard errors are clustered by year and 
audit office.  In the determinant analysis, we examine both the intensity of skill requirements (i.e., the 
number of skills required) and the relative weight of skill requirements (i.e., the percentage of skills in 
the corresponding skill type).  
 Table 5 reports the results of the determinants analysis. In column (1), the dependent variable 
is the total number of skills demanded in the job post.  We find a significantly positive coefficient on 
the time trend, consistent with upskilling demonstrated in prior studies over this time period (Hershbein 
and Kahn 2018). In columns (2) through (6) we examine the number of skills within each skill 
category—cognitive, social, financial, IT, and other. Consistent with column (1), we again find a 
significantly positive coefficient on the time trend in each specification. Therefore, because all of the 
skill types are increasing over our sample period, to better understand how the overall skill sets of 
auditors are changing, we examine the relative proportion of each skill type in columns (7) through 
(11). We see that cognitive, social, and IT skills are making up a greater proportion of the skill 
requirements over the sample period. These increases in skill requirements are predominantly coming 
from the uncategorized skills while the financial skills remained relatively steady as a fraction of total 
skills over the sample period. This is consistent with the interpretation that with the advancement and 
application of information technology, IT skills, cognitive skills and social skills are becoming more 
important for audit professionals.  
Several other findings are noteworthy. For instance, as may be expected, we find that more 
senior positions require more overall skills. This is predominantly driven by more social and financial 
skills whereas more senior job postings actually require fewer cognitive and IT skills. The Big 4 firms 
require more skills overall, though this tends to be driven by the uncategorized skills. Given reports 
that the Big 4 are investing more heavily into technology relative to the non-Big 4 audit firms, it may 
seem surprising that they do not require more IT skills from their auditors. However, our findings in 
Table 3 suggest the Big 4 firms are hiring more IT personnel in recent years. Therefore, the differential 
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response may be related more to hiring IT-specific employees whereas the changes in skill demands 
for auditors is relatively steady across Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms.   
4.4 Heterogeneity in Auditor Skill Sets 
Next, we examine the degree to which a series of observable characteristics explains the 
variation in skill demands. Specifically, we regress the number of skills demanded in a job posting on 
a series of fixed effects and control variables and then gauge the degree to which each explains 
variation in the skill demands. We initially include audit firm, city, and year fixed effects, as well as 
controls for job seniority (e.g., associate, manager, etc.) and education and experience requirements. 
#(Skill Requirement) =  β0  + β1 * Edu + β2 * Exp + β3 * I(Edu) + β4 * I(Exp)    
         + β5 * Hierarchy + Audit Firm FE + City FE +Year FE + ε,     (3) 
We estimate separate regressions for the total number of skills in the job posting as well as for 
the four skill categories (cognitive, social, IT, and financial). Table 6 Panel A reports the results. While 
the explanatory power varies by skill type, the audit firm is the dominant predictor of variation in the 
skill demands. Specifically, audit firms explain an average of 15% of the variation in skill demands 
whereas city explains 2% and year, education/experience, and seniority each explain 1% on average. 
There is considerable unexplained variation, 81% on average and ranging from 64% for social skills 
to 91% for IT skills. Next, we estimate similar models, but include audit office fixed effects, which is 
essentially an audit firm by city fixed effect. Results are reported in Table 6 Panel B. As expected, 
audit office dominates, explaining an average of 21% of the variation in skill demands whereas year, 
education/experience, and seniority each explain approximately 1% or less. The unexplained variation 
remains high at an average of 77% and ranging from 59% for social skills to 87% for IT skills. 
Finally, we conduct this variance decomposition analysis at the audit office level by taking 
averages across all jobs in each audit office by calendar year. In these specifications we include auditor, 
city, and year fixed effects, along with controls for seniority, education, and experience requirements. 
Consistent with our expectation that taking the average of skill demands across job postings by office-
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year would reduce idiosyncratic factors that affect job posting skill demands, Table 6 Panel C shows 
significantly increased explanatory power. The audit firm fixed effects are the dominant factor, 
explaining an average of 38% of the variation in skill demands. Despite this, there still remains 
substantial unexplained variation at an average of 48% and ranging from 30% for social skills to 61% 
for IT skills. 
In sum, this exercise provides preliminary evidence that audit offices have systematic 
differences in their recruiting strategies and possibly differences in skill utilization. It is worth noting 
that there is substantial remaining variation across audit job postings, which may reflect within audit 
office variation that we could not observe. In the next section, we exploit the discretion afforded to 
audit offices in the skills demanded of their auditors to better understand how auditor skills correlate 
with audit quality and audit fees. 
4.5 Auditor Skill Sets, Audit Quality, and Audit Pricing 
 In this section, we examine whether the skill demands in an audit office’s job postings is 
correlated with the audit outcomes for the corresponding office. To do so, we follow the audit quality 
framework provided by Defond and Zhang (2014).  Specifically, on the supply side of audit quality, 
both auditor’s incentives and competencies are main factors that affect audit quality. Our focus is on 
one important dimension of auditor competencies: auditors’ skill sets as measured through the skill 
demands in job postings. Our approach builds on the existing audit literature that examines how audit 
partner characteristics contribute to audit quality (i.e., Chi et al., 2017; Lennox and Wu, 2018).  
We also examine how auditor skills are correlated with audit pricing. Ex ante, it is unclear how 
auditor skills would be associated with audit pricing. On the one hand, more skilled auditors may 
demand higher wages, which may result in higher audit fees per audit hour. On the other hand, highly 
skilled auditors could increase work efficiency and thus reduce audit hours and the associated audit 
fees. Moreover, it is unclear how the different types of skills will correlate with both audit quality and 
audit fees. We therefore use the following empirical model to test our research questions:  
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Restatement / Audit Feesijt  = β0 + β1 * Office Skillsijt + Σβk * Control Variables + ε ijt   (4) 
 Our proxy for audit quality is client 10-K restatements given that prior studies have suggested 
restatements are a direct measure of audit quality (Defond and Zhang, 2014; Christensen et al., 2016; 
Aobdia et al., 2019). We use a dichotomous variable (Restatement) that takes the value of 1 if the 
financial statement audited by audit office j for client-firm i in period t is subsequently restated, and 
otherwise takes the value of 0. Audit Feeijt is the log of audit fee by audit office j for client-firm i in 
the period t. 
Due to the data limitations we are not able to identify engagement level auditor skill sets. 
Instead, we follow the existing literature and measure auditor characteristics at the audit office level 
(i.e., Beck, Gunn, and Hallman, 2019; Francis and Yu, 2009). Our office level skill measures capture 
the average skill requirement of all the audit job postings issued by the engagement audit office. For 
example, Office #(Cognitive Skill)ijt, is measured as the arithmetic average of #(Cognitive Skill) for all 
the audit job postings issued by audit office j during the 12 months ending at the fiscal year end t of 
client firm i.16 To reduce the noise of our office level skill measures, we require a minimum of 10 audit 
job postings. We use the skill measures that capture the number of skills within the job posting (not 
the indicator or relative weights). We also separately examine total skills and the four skill categories 
for cognitive, social, IT, and financial skills. We estimate the model using either logistic or OLS 
regression, depending on the nature of the dependent variable, and cluster standard errors by each 
unique client firm. 
 We follow the existing literature to draw our set of control variables from several prior studies 
that investigate audit quality and audit pricing (e.g., Beck, Gun, and Hallman, 2019; Francis and Yu, 
2014). To control for the effect of client characteristics, we include proxies for the following: client 
size (Client Size), leverage (Debt), performance (Loss), cash flows (Cash Flows), growth (Revenue 
                                                 
16 We use a 12-month rolling window to calculate the average skill requirements. Specifically, we require at least 6 
months’ job postings observation. 
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Growth), the variability of cash flows (Cash Flows SD) and revenue (Revenue SD). In the restatement 
model, we control for whether the financial statements were restated in the prior year (Restatementt-1), 
and in the audit fee model we control for the lagged audit fee Audit Feet-1. In addition, we control for 
following audit office related variables: the length of the auditor–client relationship (Tenure), audit 
office size (Office Size), and audit-office industry market leadership (Industry Leader). We also include 
industry and year fixed effects.  
 Since there is a time lag between the time that a material misstatement occurs in a financial 
statement and the time that the misstatement is discovered and corrected, we end our sample period in 
2016.17 Our final sample contains 7,482 audit engagements by 279 unique audit offices (28 unique 
audit firms). Table 7 Panel A provides summary statistics for our empirical analysis. On average, audit 
offices demand a total of 13 skills, 0.8 cognitive skill, 1.8 social skills, 5 financial skills and 1.2 IT 
skills.  
 Table 7 Panel B reports the regression results when the dependent variable is the dummy 
variable Restatement. From column (1) to column (5), we test how each skill measure is associated 
with the probability that a client firm’s financial statement will be subsequently restated. Results in 
column (1) show that an audit office’s average total number of skills is negatively associated with the 
probability of restatement. The coefficient of -0.057 is statistically significant at the 1% level. Results 
in columns (2) and (3) show that both auditor’s cognitive skills and social skills have statistically 
significant negative associations with the probability of restatement. Our findings are consistent with 
our conjecture that both social skills and cognitive skills are important skills auditors need to 
effectively collect and communicate information and hence make critical audit judgments. Column (4) 
shows that financial skills are positively associated with the probability of restatement, though it is 
only marginally significant. The association between IT skills and restatement probability is negative 
but not statistically significant. Overall, these results suggest that offices with more skilled auditors 
                                                 
17 Extending our sample period to 2017 does not qualitatively change our results. 
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tend to produce higher quality audits, and this effect is driven by the cognitive and social skills, not 
the financial or IT skills.  
 Table 7 Panel C reports the regression results when the dependent variable is the log of audit 
fees charged to the client firm. The table is similarly organized as Panel B. The results show that all 
skill measures have a negative association with audit fees, but only total skills, cognitive skills and IT 
skills are statistically significant. Thus, our results are more consistent with the interpretation that 
auditors’ skills could contribute to the efficiency of audit engagement and level of audit risk (i.e., lower 
probability of financial restatement) and consequently lower audit fees. 
 
5. Additional Tests  
5.1 Controlling for City Fixed Effects 
 One endogeneity concern about our findings on auditor’s skill sets and audit quality/audit fees 
is that the association could be driven by some common factors shared by both the audit office and 
client firm. For example it is possible that in cities with better labor market conditions (i.e., more high 
quality or competitive labor markets), audit offices are more likely to require highly skilled auditors 
and client firms are also more likely to be equipped with high quality employees and thus have higher 
financial reporting quality. In untabulated analyses we include city fixed effect for all of the models in 
Table 7 and our inferences remain unchanged. 
5.2 Placebo test 
 To provide extra evidence that our skill measures reflect audit office’s demand for audit skills, 
we run a placebo test. We replace each audit office’s job postings in a given year with a randomly 
chosen sample and re-run our audit quality and audit pricing test. Specifically, for each audit office-
year, we replace each job post within the audit office-year with another job post from outside the audit 
office-year that is chosen at random. We then estimate the models in Table 7 using the office skill 
measures based on the placebo job postings. We repeat the procedure 200 times and conduct t-test on 
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the 200 estimated coefficients for the different skill measures. We find that all the estimated skill 
coefficients are not statistically different from zero. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The emergence of new technologies is redefining the labor market across all industries, 
including audit firms. In this study, we exploit a unique and nearly comprehensive dataset of online 
job postings by audit firms in the US from 2007 to 2017 to address three core research questions: 1) 
Has the demand for auditors and non-auditor information technology (IT) staff changed? 2) How the 
demand for auditor skill sets changed? 3) How are auditor’s skill sets associated with audit quality and 
audit pricing?  
 First, we find that between 2007 and 2017, the demand for auditors has decreased, while the 
demand for IT-related personnel in audit firms has increased. Second, among the auditor positions in 
our sample, we find that audit firms are increasingly demanding more social, cognitive and IT-related 
skills. Third, auditor skills are positively (negatively) associated with audit quality (fees) and this effect 
is driven by cognitive and social skills (cognitive and IT skills). 
 Our study complements the existing literature that examines how auditor incentives and 
competencies affect audit quality (Defond and Zhang, 2014) by incorporating data on auditor skillsets. 
Our study also directly answers recent calls by the PCAOB for more research to understand how 
changes in technology impact the skillsets required for auditors and how technology affects the 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Job Type Variables 
% Audit  
the number of audit job postings divided by the total number of job 
postings issued by an audit firm/office in a calendar year; 
% IT 
the number of IT job postings divided by the total number of job 
postings issued by an audit firm/office in a calendar year; 
% Adv 
the number of advisory job postings divided by the total number of job 
postings issued by an audit firm/office in a calendar year; 
% Tax 
the number of tax job postings divided by the total number of job 
postings issued by an audit firm/office in a calendar year; 
% Other 
the number of job postings other than audit, IT, advisory, and tax 
divided by the total number of job postings;  
Skill Requirement Variables 
#(Total Skill) the total number of skills demanded by a job posting; 
#(Cognitive Skill) the number of cognitive skills demanded by a job posting; 
#(Social Skill) the number of social skills demanded by a job posting; 
#(IT Skill) the number of IT skills demanded by a job posting; 
#(Financial Skill) the number of financial skills demanded by a job posting; 
#(Other Skill) 
The number of skills other than cognitive, social, IT and financial 
demanded by a job posting; 
I(Cognitive Skill) 1 if a job posting requires at least 1 cognitive skill, otherwise 0;  
I(Social Skill) 1 if a job posting requires at least 1 social skill, otherwise 0; 
I(IT Skill) 1 if a job posting requires at least 1 IT skill, otherwise 0; 
I(Financial Skill) 1 if a job posting requires at least 1 financial skill, otherwise 0; 
%(Cognitive Skill) 
number of cognitive skills demanded by a job posting divided the total 
number of skills demanded; 
%( Social Skill) 
number of social skills demanded by a job posting divided by the total 
number of skills demanded;  
%(IT Skill) 
number of IT skills demanded by a job posting divided by the total 
number of skills demanded; 
%(Financial Skill) 
number of financial skills demanded by a job posting divided by the 
total number of skills demanded; 
%(Other Skill) 
number of skills other than cognitive, social, IT and financial demanded 
by a job posting divided by the total number of skills demanded; 
I(Edu) 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a job posting lists an education 
requirement, 0 otherwise; 
I(Exp) 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a job posting lists an experience 
requirement, 0 otherwise; 
Edu 
years of education demanded by a job posting conditional on the job 
posting listing an education requirement; 
Exp 
years of experience demanded by a job posting conditional on the job 
posting listing an experience requirement; 
Office #(Total Skill) 
the average total number of skills demanded of all the audit job postings 
issued by an audit office in a given period; 
Office #(Cognitive Skill) 
the average number of cognitive skills demanded of all the audit job 
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Office #(Social Skill) 
the average number of social skills demanded of all the audit job 
postings issued by an audit office in a given period; 
Office # (IT Skill) 
the average number of IT skills demanded of all the audit job postings 
issued by an audit office in a given period; 
Office #(Financial Skill) 
the average number of financial skills demanded of all the audit job 
postings issued by an audit office in a given period; 
Other Variables 
Big4 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the engagement audit office is a Big4 
audit firm office; 0 otherwise; 
Cash Flow 
total client-firm cash flows from operations (Compustat item OANCF) 
scaled by total assets (Compustat item AT); 
Debt 
total client-firm debt (Compustat item DLTT) scaled by total assets 
(Compustat item AT); 
Going Concern 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client-firm received a going 
concern opinion in the current year; 0 otherwise (Audit Analytics item 
Going_Concern); 
Industry Leader 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the engagement audit office for the 
current year collects more audit fees from clients in the same two-digits 
SIC industry than any other office in the same city; 0 otherwise; 
Client Size 
The natural log of the client’s total assets in millions of dollars 
(Compustat item AT); 
Office Size 
the natural log of total audit fees generated during the current year by 
the engagement audit office. An audit office is defined as all audits for 
which the opinion is signed by a common audit firm (Audit Analytics 
item Auditor_Fkey) and city name (Audit Analytics item 
Auditor_City); 
Audit Fees the natural log of audit fees paid by the client firm in the current year; 
Audit Feet-1 the natural log of audit fees paid by the client firm in year t -1; 
Restatement 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm-year’s financial statements 
were eventually restated for any reason, as reported by Audit 
Analytics’ Restatements database; 0 otherwise; 
Restatementt-1 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm-year’s financial statements 
from year t-1 were eventually restated for any reason, as reported by 
Audit Analytics’ Restatements database; 0 otherwise. 
Loss 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income (Compustat item NI) is 
negative; 0 otherwise; 
CFO SD 
the standard deviation of operating cash flows (Compustat item 
OANCF) for the period t-4 through t-1; 
Revenue SD 
the standard deviation of client firm revenue (Compustat item REVT) 
for the period t-4 through t-1; 
Revenue Growth 
total client-firm revenue in the current year (Compustat item REVT), 
scaled by total client-firm revenue in year t-1; 
Tenure 
the number of consecutive years that the same audit firm has issued 
an opinion on the company's annual financial statements; 
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Figures 1: Auditor Skill Sets 
 
The figure shows a word cloud for the top 200 ranked skills in terms of frequency in our auditor job postings sample. Word cloud is created using 







Table 1. Sample Distribution 
 
Panel A presents the distribution of our final sample across years and Big4 versus Non-Big4 auditors. Our final sample is generated through 
manually matching the auditor name, state and city from Audit Analytics to the Burning Glass database. Panel B reports the top 20 cities in 
terms of number of job postings in our final job postings sample and the top 20 cities in terms of total audit fees in Audit Analytics. Panel C 
shows the distribution of different job types (i.e., Audit, Tax, Advisory, IT and Others) during our sample period. 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution over Sample Period 
  Non-Big4 Auditors Big4 Auditors 
year # of obs # of auditors # of obs percent # of auditors # of obs percent 
2007 28509 31 9424 33.06% 3 19085 66.94% 
2010 21343 64 3936 18.44% 3 17407 81.56% 
2011 42076 71 8368 19.89% 3 33708 80.11% 
2012 37833 64 9600 25.37% 4 28233 74.63% 
2013 82035 77 12220 14.90% 4 69815 85.10% 
2014 103091 77 12449 12.08% 4 90642 87.92% 
2015 104584 76 12160 11.63% 4 92424 88.37% 
2016 69172 66 8962 12.96% 4 60210 87.04% 
2017 65581 71 9958 15.18% 4 55623 84.82% 




Table 1 Continued 
 
Panel B: Top 20 Cities based on Job Postings and Audit Fees  
 
Top 20 Cities Based on Job Posting Top 20 Cities Based on Audit Fees 
State City Percent State City Percent 
New York New York 13.22% New York New York 17.65% 
Illinois Chicago 7.21% Illinois Chicago 5.94% 
Texas Dallas 5.12% Massachusetts Boston 5.23% 
California Los Angeles 4.69% Texas Houston 4.67% 
California San Francisco 4.69% California San Jose 4.07% 
Georgia Atlanta 4.62% Pennsylvania Philadelphia 3.58% 
Massachusetts Boston 4.01% Texas Dallas 3.34% 
Virginia Mclean 3.96% California Los Angeles 3.25% 
Pennsylvania Philadelphia 3.88% Virginia Mclean 3.24% 
Texas Houston 3.20% Georgia Atlanta 3.06% 
Minnesota Minneapolis 2.66% California San Francisco 2.96% 
North Carolina Charlotte 2.36% Connecticut Stamford 2.18% 
Michigan Detroit 1.97% Michigan Detroit 2.15% 
California San Jose 1.97% North Carolina Charlotte 2.13% 
Washington Seattle 1.95% Minnesota Minneapolis 1.99% 
Colorado Denver 1.81% Colorado Denver 1.72% 
D.C. Washington 1.70% Washington Seattle 1.52% 
Ohio Cleveland 1.49% Missouri Saint Louis 1.46% 
Connecticut Stamford 1.44% Ohio Cleveland 1.45% 
New Jersey Parsippany 1.43% Connecticut Hartford 1.22% 





Table 1 Continued 
 
Panel C: Sample Distribution over Different Job Types 
 
Year Total Obs Audit Jobs Tax Jobs IT Jobs Advisory Jobs Other Jobs 
2007 28509 6261 21.96% 8652 30.35% 982 3.44% 4090 14.35% 8524 29.90% 
2010 21343 3059 14.33% 4965 23.26% 1857 8.70% 3396 15.91% 8066 37.79% 
2011 42076 7377 17.53% 9924 23.59% 3342 7.94% 9415 22.38% 12018 28.56% 
2012 37833 5456 14.42% 6258 16.54% 4285 11.33% 11321 29.92% 10513 27.79% 
2013 82035 6882 8.39% 9288 11.32% 14242 17.36% 29853 36.39% 21770 26.54% 
2014 103091 9361 9.08% 10911 10.58% 19422 18.84% 36184 35.10% 27213 26.40% 
2015 104584 9994 9.56% 12627 12.07% 18937 18.11% 33696 32.22% 29330 28.04% 
2016 69172 5444 7.87% 7884 11.40% 13593 19.65% 21405 30.94% 20846 30.14% 
2017 65581 4521 6.89% 6322 9.64% 13588 20.72% 21992 33.53% 19158 29.21% 





Table 2. Audit Firm Demand for Labor over Time 
 
The table reports the results of Equation (1), the regression of the proportion of different job types relative 
to all job postings by an audit firm or office in the corresponding year (% Audit,  % IT, % Adv, % Tax, 
and % Other) on Time Trend. Panel A reports the results of the audit firm level analysis. Panel B reports 
the regression results at the audit office level. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors 
are clustered by year and t-stats are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Job Type Regression  
 
 % Audit % IT % Adv % Tax % Other 
Time Trend -0.067*** 0.030*** 0.051* -0.053*** 0.039 
 (-4.184) (4.023) (2.107) (-6.898) (1.508) 
Constant 0.299*** 0.029*** 0.110*** 0.272*** 0.290*** 
 (26.049) (5.497) (6.566) (49.686) (14.883) 
Auditor Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237 237 237 
Adj R2 0.646 0.592 0.754 0.628 0.538 
 
 
Panel B: Office Level Job Type Regression  
 
 % Audit % IT % Adv % Tax % Other 
Time Trend -0.077*** 0.089*** 0.099*** -0.090*** -0.022 
 (-5.643) (7.711) (3.787) (-4.217) (-0.933) 
Constant 0.234*** 0.047*** 0.158*** 0.275*** 0.286*** 
 (20.507) (6.480) (9.933) (19.181) (15.570) 
Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 
Adj R2 0.625 0.650 0.632 0.617 0.583 
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Table 3. Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 Demand for Labor over Time 
 
The table reports results of Equation (1), the regression of the proportion of different job types relative to 
all job postings by an accounting firm or office in the corresponding year (%Audit, % IT,  %Adv, % Tax, 
and %Other) on Time Trend interacted with the indicator variable Big4 (Trend * Big4). Panel A reports 
the results of the audit firm level analysis. Panel B reports the regression results at the audit office level. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by year and t-stats are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firm Level Job Type Regression with Big 4 Interaction 
 
 % Audit % IT % Adv % Tax % Other 
Time Trend -0.072*** 0.013 0.051* -0.048** 0.057* 
 (-4.356) (1.058) (1.985) (-3.120) (2.017) 
Trend *Big4 0.028* 0.090*** 0.004 -0.028 -0.094** 
 (2.192) (3.805) (0.172) (-0.464) (-2.732) 
Constant 0.300*** 0.032*** 0.110*** 0.271*** 0.287*** 
 (25.782) (4.920) (6.552) (42.208) (14.608) 
F test of Time Trend + Trend * Big4 = 0      
F stats 5.563 72.71 3.518 2.608 1.185 
F test p value 0.046 0.000 0.097 0.145 0.308 
 
Auditor Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 237 237 237 237 237 
Adj R2 0.644 0.617 0.753 0.627 0.541 
 
 
Panel B: Office Level Job Type Regression with Big 4 Interaction 
 
 % Audit % IT % Adv % Tax % Other 
Time Trend -0.123*** 0.042* 0.171** 
-
0.099*** 0.009 
 (-5.254) (2.168) (3.007) (-4.028) (0.197) 
Trend *Big4 0.071** 0.072** -0.110* 0.015 -0.047 
 (2.382) (2.449) (-1.990) (0.245) (-0.653) 
Constant 0.235*** 0.048*** 0.157*** 0.275*** 0.286*** 
 (22.048) (7.512) (10.252) (19.702) (16.135) 
F test of Time Trend + Trend * Big4 = 0      
F stats 10.32 48.74 14.15 4.540 1.031 
F test p value 0.012 0.000 0.005 0.066 0.340 
 
Office Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 1,954 
Adj R2 0.629 0.657 0.640 0.617 0.585 
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Table 4: Description of Job Skills 
 
Panel A shows the authors’ categorization of open text fields in Burning Glass Technologies data. Panel B shows the summary of skill 
demands for audit job postings in our final job posting sample with 58,355 observations ranging from 2007 to 2017.   
 
Panel A: Categorization of Job Skills 
 
Job Skills Keywords and Phrases 
Cognitive 
research, problem solving, creativity, thought leadership, analytic, multi-tasking, decision making, thinking, 
calculation, analysis, statistic 
Social 
communication, teamwork, collaboration, leadership, presentation, relationships, mentoring, people development, 
team development, team building, public speaking, persuasion, listening, writ 
IT 
computer, spreadsheets, data, microsoft, oracle, sap, sql, peoplesoft, java, hyperion, sad, unix, calypso, common 
software (e.g., microsoft excel, powerpoint) 
Financial 
accounting, budgeting, economics, finance, business, tax, cost, audit, sox, capital markets, fas109, sas70, fin48, 




Table 4 Continued: 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Audit Job Skill Demands 
 # Obs. Mean Sd Min Max 
#(Total Skill)  58355 12.17 7.59 1 75 
#(Cognitive Skill) 58355 0.79 1.06 0 12 
#(Social Skill) 58355 1.46 1.69 0 12 
#(Financial Skill) 58355 5.03 3.38 0 24 
#(IT Skill) 58355 1.17 2.32 0 32 
#(Other Skill) 58355 3.97 3.39 0 56 
I(Cognitive Skill) 58355 0.48 0.50 0 1 
I(Social Skill) 58355 0.61 0.49 0 1 
I(Financial Skill) 58355 0.92 0.27 0 1 
I(IT Skill) 58355 0.33 0.47 0 1 
I(Other Skill) 58355 0.90 0.30 0 1 
%(Cognitive Skill) 58355 0.06 0.08 0 1 
%(Social Skill) 58355 0.11 0.13 0 1 
%(Financial Skill) 58355 0.44 0.27 0 1 
%(IT Skill) 58355 0.07 0.12 0 1 
%(Other Skill) 58355 0.34 0.23 0 1 
Edu18 58355 16.03 0.49 12 21 





                                                 
18 For our sample, 20% (37%) of the audit job postings do not include an education requirement (experience requirement). 
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Table 4 Continued  
 


































#(Total Skill) 1.00                
#(Cognitive Skill) 0.47 1.00               
#(Social Skill) 0.46 0.33 1.00              
#(Financial Skill) 0.66 0.24 0.03 1.00             
#(IT Skill) 0.64 0.15 0.13 0.16 1.00            
#(Other Skill) 0.85 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.55 1.00           
I(Cognitive Skill) 0.40 0.78 0.38 0.21 0.06 0.26 1.00          
I(Social Skill) 0.46 0.40 0.70 0.14 0.18 0.34 0.43 1.00         
I(Financial Skill) 0.38 0.17 0.20 0.44 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.27 1.00        
I(IT Skill) 0.55 0.30 0.21 0.16 0.72 0.47 0.19 0.29 0.13 1.00       
I(Other Skill) 0.32 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.39 0.17 0.26 -0.05 0.12 1.00      
%(Cognitive Skill) 0.13 0.78 0.16 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.74 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.07 1.00     
%(Social Skill) 0.12 0.14 0.82 -0.21 -0.06 0.06 0.25 0.68 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.00    
%(Financial Skill) -0.16 -0.20 -0.40 0.46 -0.30 -0.38 -0.18 -0.35 0.49 -0.31 -0.48 -0.17 -0.39 1.00   
%(IT Skill) 0.38 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.83 0.31 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.77 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.32 1.00  
%(Other Skill) -0.09 -0.11 -0.08 -0.39 -0.01 0.27 -0.15 -0.12 -0.68 -0.05 0.49 -0.17 -0.14 -0.71 -0.09 1.00 





Table 5: Determinants of Audit Job Posting Skill Requirements 
 
The table reports results of Equation (2), the regression of different skill demands (e.g., #(Total Skill), #(Cognitive Skill), #(Social Skill)) on different 
job posting characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by audit office and year, and t-stats are reported in 























Trend 3.340*** 0.580** 0.530*** 0.854** 0.661*** 0.785*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.002 0.029** -0.100** 
 (-7.435) (3.096) (6.701) (2.769) (4.251) (4.710) (3.391) (6.731) (0.037) (2.711) (-2.997) 
Edu -0.099 0.007 0.254** 0.180* -0.225*** -0.336*** 0.001 0.021*** 0.008 -0.010*** -0.019*** 
 (-0.455) (0.197) (2.461) (1.911) (-4.406) (-3.928) (0.505) (3.634) (1.097) (-3.441) (-4.758) 
Exp 0.244 0.035 0.099*** -0.040 0.045 0.104 0.003 0.006*** -0.007 0.003* -0.005* 
 (1.518) (1.146) (3.939) (-0.680) (1.119) (1.486) (1.857) (4.042) (-1.350) (1.879) (-2.292) 
I(Edu) 6.244 0.151 -3.638* 0.013 3.695*** 6.369*** 0.003 -0.318** 0.035 0.159*** 0.121 
 (1.837) (0.250) (-2.166) (0.008) (4.594) (4.704) (0.077) (-3.335) (0.287) (3.364) (1.800) 
I(Exp) 2.864** 0.026 0.322 1.014* 0.651** 0.997** -0.013 0.008 -0.010 0.026** -0.003 
 (2.541) (0.154) (1.440) (1.997) (2.806) (2.307) (-1.480) (0.447) (-0.272) (2.731) (-0.154) 
Hierarchy 0.515** -0.067** 0.056** 0.349*** -0.111** 0.308*** -0.011*** -0.005* -0.003 -0.012*** 0.031*** 
 (3.334) (-3.185) (2.566) (3.661) (-2.617) (4.631) (-4.589) (-2.198) (-0.390) (-5.000) (8.850) 
Big4 1.176* -0.085 0.020 0.268 -0.010 0.802** 0.001 -0.007 -0.043** -0.013 0.054*** 
 (2.036) (-1.088) (0.147) (1.611) (-0.072) (3.084) (0.135) (-0.730) (-2.367) (-1.789) (5.368) 
Constant 1.774** 0.388** 0.172 0.434 0.544** 0.399 0.057*** 0.075*** 0.374*** 0.078*** 0.432*** 
 (2.711) (2.689) (1.375) (1.174) (2.391) (1.283) (5.872) (5.516) (8.327) (6.203) (8.322) 
            
N 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 58,355 0.171 







Table 6:  Variances in Skill Requirements 
 
Panel A and B report the explanatory power of different factors affecting the variation of audit job 
posting skill requirements (#(Social Skill), #(Cognitive Skill), #(Financial Skill), #(IT Skill), and 
#(Total Skill)). We regress the total number of skills demanded, the number of specific skills (i.e., 
Cognitive, Social, Financial, and IT) demanded by a job posting on audit firm/office fixed effects, 
and additional controls (city fixed effect, year fixed effect, education and experience requirements, 
and job position’s hierarchy). Panel C reports results for similar analyses conducted at the audit 
office level. All skill requirements and job posting characteristics are aggregated at the audit office 
level. For example, Office #(Social Skill) is the average number of total skill requirements for all 
the audit job postings issued by an audit office by calendar year. 
 
Panel A: Job Posting Skill Requirement  
Skill Type Audit Firm Fixed Effect Other Controls Residual 
#(Social Skill) 0.33 0.03 0.64 
#(Cognitive Skill) 0.13 0.05 0.81 
#(Financial Skill) 0.13 0.04 0.83 
#(IT Skill) 0.04 0.05 0.91 
#(Total Skill) 0.09 0.05 0.86 
 
Panel B: Job Posting Skill Requirement 
Skill Type Audit Office Fixed Effect Other Controls Residual 
#(Social Skill) 0.39 0.01 0.59 
#(Cognitive Skill) 0.21 0.02 0.77 
#(Financial Skill) 0.19 0.02 0.80 
#(IT Skill) 0.11 0.02 0.87 
#(Total Skill) 0.17 0.02 0.81 
 
Panel C: Office Skill Requirement 
Skill Type Audit Firm Fixed Effect Other Controls Residual 
Office #(Social Skill) 0.63 0.07 0.30 
Office #(Cognitive Skill) 0.41 0.12 0.47 
Office #(Financial Skill) 0.35 0.15 0.50 
Office #(IT Skill) 0.22 0.17 0.61 




Table 7: Auditor Skill Sets, Audit Quality and Audit Pricing 
 
Table 7 reports results of Equation (4), the regression of audit quality (audit fees) on auditor skill sets. 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this sample. Panel B reports results of 
multivariate regressions of audit quality (restatement probability) on the engagement audit office’s skill 
measures (Office #(Total Skill), Office #(Cognitive Skill), Office #(Social Skill), Office #(Financial Skill) 
and Office #(IT skill) ). Panel B reports results of multivariate regression of the log of audit fees on the 
engagement audit office’s skill measures. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
clustered by client firm and t-stats are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Count Min Mean Median Max SD 
Restatement 7482 0.000 0.106 0.000 1.000 0.307 
Restatementt-1 7482 0.000 0.111 0.000 1.000 0.315 
Audfee 7482 11.876 14.338 14.286 17.122 1.049 
Audfeet-1 7482 11.678 14.274 14.222 17.093 1.079 
Office #(Total Skill) 7482 3.333 13.062 13.405 22.339 3.726 
Office #(Cognitive 
Skill) 7482 0.088 0.774 0.673 2.240 0.484 
Office #(Social Skill) 7482 0.000 1.842 1.326 5.059 1.474 
Office #(Financial 
Skill) 7482 0.679 4.995 5.065 9.775 2.028 
Office #(IT Skill) 7482 0.000 1.166 0.883 4.200 1.070 
Going Concern 7482 0.000 0.023 0.000 1.000 0.149 
CFO 7482 -0.755 0.055 0.082 0.324 0.159 
Debt 7482 0.000 0.228 0.192 1.066 0.225 
Client Size 7482 2.548 7.136 7.177 11.665 1.926 
Loss 7482 0.000 0.296 0.000 1.000 0.457 
Revenue Growth 7482 -0.612 0.112 0.060 2.235 0.345 
Revenue SD 7482 0.007 0.146 0.094 0.895 0.155 
CFO SD 7482 0.005 0.063 0.035 0.566 0.088 
Industry Leader 7482 0.000 0.596 1.000 1.000 0.491 
Office Size 7482 13.865 17.861 18.105 20.189 1.213 




Table 7 Continued 
Panel B: Auditor Skill Sets and Audit Quality 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
#(Total Skill) -0.057***     
 (-3.909)     
#(Cognitive Skill)  -0.376***    
 
 (-3.211)    
#(Social Skill)   -0.184***   
 
  (-5.126)   
#(Financial Skill)    0.039*  
 
   (1.677)  
#(IT Skill)     -0.052 
 
    (-1.116) 
Office Size -0.047 -0.044 -0.032 -0.048 -0.056 
 (-0.973) (-0.927) (-0.679) (-1.000) (-1.148) 
Big4 0.113 0.078 0.134 0.258 0.200 
 (0.465) (0.318) (0.567) (1.088) (0.841) 
Industry Leader 0.062 0.078 0.070 0.094 0.084 
 (0.626) (0.795) (0.706) (0.952) (0.848) 
Loss 0.219* 0.224* 0.257** 0.221* 0.210* 
 (1.762) (1.808) (2.057) (1.775) (1.690) 
Client Size 0.057* 0.057* 0.057* 0.056* 0.057* 
 (1.812) (1.786) (1.766) (1.761) (1.781) 
CFO 0.103 0.176 0.117 0.168 0.145 
 (0.254) (0.432) (0.286) (0.410) (0.356) 
Debt 0.633*** 0.642*** 0.639*** 0.678*** 0.671*** 
 (2.855) (2.926) (2.895) (3.060) (3.031) 
Revenue Growth 0.024 0.019 0.049 0.028 0.022 
 (0.147) (0.117) (0.302) (0.172) (0.133) 
Going Concern -0.825 -0.827 -0.897 -0.812 -0.799 
 (-1.526) (-1.521) (-1.633) (-1.502) (-1.485) 
Tenure -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.540) (-0.498) (-0.586) (-0.396) (-0.423) 
Revenue SD 0.076 0.078 0.125 0.092 0.076 
 (0.233) (0.241) (0.396) (0.287) (0.234) 
CFO SD -1.588* -1.516* -1.466* -1.495* -1.542* 
 (-1.929) (-1.841) (-1.822) (-1.824) (-1.867) 
Restatementt-1 3.127*** 3.130*** 3.094*** 3.127*** 3.132*** 
 (30.934) (30.913) (30.133) (30.919) (31.091) 
Constant -1.152 -1.422 -1.415 -1.720* -1.461 
 (-1.263) (-1.587) (-1.519) (-1.921) (-1.643) 
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 7,388 




Table 7 Continued 
Panel C: Auditor Skill Sets and Audit Pricing 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Office #(Total Skill) -0.003***     
 (-2.727)     
Office #(Cognitive Skill)  -0.021***    
  (-2.824)    
Office #(Social Skill)   -0.001   
   (-0.240)   
Office #(Financial Skill)    -0.001  
    (-0.391)  
Office #(IT Skill)     -0.008** 
     (-2.313) 
Office Size 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (6.020) (6.058) (5.939) (5.947) (5.798) 
Big4 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.016 0.016 
 (0.607) (0.559) (0.920) (0.869) (0.871) 
Industry Leader 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (5.105) (5.203) (5.319) (5.322) (5.138) 
Loss 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
 (3.254) (3.268) (3.274) (3.268) (3.183) 
Client Size 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
 (19.368) (19.347) (19.434) (19.448) (19.387) 
CFO -0.050 -0.048 -0.048 -0.048 -0.049 
 (-1.217) (-1.170) (-1.187) (-1.185) (-1.200) 
Debt -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 
 (-0.875) (-0.871) (-0.831) (-0.833) (-0.823) 
Revenue Growth 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (5.022) (4.996) (4.999) (5.003) (4.979) 
Going Concern -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-0.249) (-0.235) (-0.240) (-0.236) (-0.180) 
Tenure -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** 
 (-2.626) (-2.608) (-2.581) (-2.569) (-2.636) 
Revenue SD 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
 (2.657) (2.682) (2.663) (2.659) (2.679) 
CFO SD 0.106 0.106 0.109 0.108 0.103 
 (1.211) (1.211) (1.251) (1.241) (1.182) 
AudFeet-1 0.746*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 0.746*** 
 (61.752) (61.675) (61.743) (61.875) (61.730) 
Constant 2.344*** 2.322*** 2.311*** 2.314*** 2.330*** 
 (19.398) (19.367) (19.279) (19.158) (19.277) 
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 7,479 
Adj R2 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.927 
 
